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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 3291 
HORTENSE B. CORBETT, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
DR. J. CAMPBELL CLARKE, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
Your petitioner, Hortense B. Corbett, plaintiff in error, re-
spectfully prays that a writ of error be awarded her from the 
final judgment rendered by the Court of Law and ChancPry 
of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, in favor of J. Campbell 
Clarke, defendant in error, on the 4th day of March, 1947, 
in a notice of motion for judgment in the amount of $25,000.00, 
due to the plaintiff in error as a result of the alleged mal-
practice of the defendant, the petitioner having duly excepted 
to the Court's action in entering up judgment against her. 
A transcript of the record is filed herewith, to which ref er-
ence is made. A copy of this petition was delivered to counsel 
foE the defendant on the 16th day of May, 1947. 
A rig·ht to be heard orally in favor of granting this peti-
tion is hereby requested. · 
2 · Supreme ·Court of Appeals of Virginia 
2• *THE CASE. 
This case was heard and decided by the Trial Court solely 
upon the pleadings, which consisted of the plaintiff's original 
notice of motion, the defendant's special plea of release, the 
plainti:ff 's replication and plea of estoppel to the special plea 
of release, and finally an amende'd notice of motion tendered 
by the plaintiff. The facts set forth in these pleadings, to. 
gether with the motions connected therewith and the rulings 
of the Court thereon, will be presented in detail under the 
following headings : 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
I 
1. The Court erred in denying the plaintiff leave to with-
draw her motion to strike out the special plea of release, and · 
in denying leave to file her replication. 
'2. The Court erred in :striking out the plaintiff's plea of 
estoppel to the special plea of· release. 
3. The Court erred in ~enying the plaintiff's motion for 
leave to :file an amended notice of motion in the place and 
stead of the original notice of motion. 
4. The Court erred in sustaining the defendant's sperial 
plea of release and in entering up judgment for the defend-
ant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
On June 17, 1946, the plaintiff consulted the defendant, a 
practicing dentist in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, for pro-
fessional advice and treatment. After an examination of 
the plaintiff's mouth, confirmed by X-ray, the defendant 
recommended the removal of all her· remaining teeth, and 
further recommended the removal of the root of a broken 
tooth which was found to be present i~ her head. Ac-
:i'"' cordingly, a later appointment was made for the *per-
formance of this work. 
On June 20, 1946, the' defendant conducted these opera-
tions : First, he extracted one of the remaining teeth of the 
plaintiff, then proceeded : with the extraction of the root of 
the broken tooth. Whi.le in the midst of this latter operation, 
but before the root was removed, he inserted a packing into 
the wound which had already been made, presumably for 
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the purpose of staunching the flow .of blood while he left the 
room to attend to another patient in an adjoining office. 
After ret:urning to the plaintiff, and apparently completing 
the balance of the operation, this packing was negligently 
sewed up in the wound. _ 
For several weeks thereafter the plaintiff continued to re-
ceive treatment from the defendant for the· conditions which 
followed this operation. An immediate swelling occurred in 
the area of the plaintiff's face surrounding the place where 
the incision had been made. The wound, as a result of the 
presence of the packing that had negligently been sewed up 
in it, failed to heal, became seriously infected, and developed 
an almost continual discharge of pus. During this period 
the defendant irrigated the wound on several occasions, and 
advised the plaintiff to have similar treatments performed by 
other physicians and specialists, which she did. . · 
On August 12, 1946, the defendant advised the· plaintiff to 
enter a hospital for the purpose of. having the remainder of 
her teeth removed, as had been originally recomme'nded. This 
was done, but before the operation the plaintiff specifically 
requested the def end ant to explore the area covered by the 
operation of June 20. The defendant either negligently failed 
to do this, or negligently conducted such an exploration, for 
the presence of the packing remained. undetected. 
On August 17, 1946, the plaintiff by her own efforts dis-
covered the presence of the packing. When she showed 
4• it to the defendant he first *attempted to deny responsi-
. bility for the same, but later admitted that he had placed 
it in the plaintiff's mouth dudng the operation .of June 20, 
1946. 
Between June 20, 1946, and August 17, 1946, the plaintiff 
was under the impression that the defendant had been treat-
ing her at all times with proper skill :;ind care, and was wholly 
unaware of his negligence in• sewing up the packing in her 
mouth, in failing to discover its presence on later examina-
tions and treatments, and in failing properly to diagnose the 
cause of the infection resulting therefrom. Not until the 
packing. was discovered did she know that this infection di-
rectly resulted from the defendant's negligence. 
On October 24, 1946, the plaintiff file9- her original notice 
of motion against the defendant, asking for damages in the 
amount of $25,000.00 as the result of the serious injuries she 
had sustained because of his negligent acts. On January 22, 
1947,. the defendant filed a special plea of release. to this ac-
tion, based upon the following· facts: 
The plaintiff had originally gone to the Standard United 
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Dental Corporation in March of 1946 for the removal of cer-
tain of her teeth. In the course of extracting one of these 
teeth, it was broken off at the root by Dr. L. R. Temple, the 
dentist in attendance. On Aug·ust 6, 1946, suit was brought 
by the plaintiff against the Dental Corporation and Dr. 
Temple jointly, charging them with negligence in the per-
formance of that operation. On August 15, 1946, the defend-
ant apparently learned of this action for the first time, · be- · 
cause he then asked the plaintiff if she was in fact bringing 
such a suit. Receiving· a:h affirmative answer the defendant 
thereupon told the plaintiff that she could never prove any 
negligence on· the part of the Dental Corporation or Dr. 
Temple, and specifically advised her to abandon the suit. 
In reliance upon this advice, the suit was later dismissed, and . 
a release given to both defendants upon payment to the 
5* plaintiff. of $225.00. * According· to the special plea of 
release, this action on the part of the plaintiff now bars 
her from recovery in the present action. 
The plaintiff made a motion to strike out this special plea 
of release, but, before this motion was argued, asked leave 
to withdraw the motion and to file her replication. This repli-
cation set forth (a) That the injuries resulting from the neg-
ligence of the defendant Dr. Clarke were separate and dis-
tinct from the injuries caused by the neglig·ence of the Dental 
Corporation and Dr. Temple; (b) that there was no causal 
connection between the negligence of the Dental Corporation 
and Dr. Temple and the injuries resulting from the independ-
ent negligence of the defendant, Dr. Clarke; and ( c) that 
the release given to the Dental Corporation ancl Dr. Temple 
did not cover the injuries and damages caused by the negli .. 
gence of the defendant. 
The Court denied leave to the plaintiff both to withdraw 
the motion to strike the special plea of release and to file 
her replication. The plaintiff then asked leave to file a 
plea of estoppel to the special plea or release, based upon the 
fact that the defendant, upon learning of her suit against the 
Dental Corporation and Dr. Temple, advised her that she 
could not prove any negligence on their part and urged her to 
abandon her suit against them. The plaintiff also asked leave 
to file an amended notice of motion for ji:dgment. 
' The Court granted the plaintiff's motion to file the plea 
of estoppel, but denied her motion to file the amended notice 
of motion. Upon defendant's motion, the Court then struck 
out the plea of estoppel and entered up final jud~rnent for 
the defendant. 
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*.ARGUMENT . 
.Assigmnen.t of Error Number One: The Court erred in de-
n,ying the plaintiff leave to withdraw her motion, to strike out 
the special plea of ·release, and in denying leave to file her 
replication. 
· A. In denying leave to withdraw the motion to strike out 
the special plea of release, it is submitted that the Trial Court 
viola tod ~ne of the axiomatic principles of common ht'w 
pleading: namely, that a party has the inalienable right to 
·m,alGe a motion on the pleadings at any stage of the proceed-
ings without leave of the court, and, save for good cause 
shown, ~as an equal right to withdraw such a motion before 
the same is ruled upon by the court. Here, the motion to 
withdraw the motion to strike was made be/ ore any other 
pleading had been filed by either party, before the Court had 
eithef heard argument or ruled upon the motion, and before 
any change of position had taken, place that could by any 
stretch of the imagination be considered as "cause'' for de-
nying the leave asked for~ Since no reasons were given by 
the Court for this action, it would appear that denial of leavP. 
to withdraw the motion to strike the defendant's special plea 
was purely arbitrary, and therefore constituted reversible 
error. 
It may well be that this procedural error on the part 0£ 
the Trial Court accounts, at least in part, for the succeeding 
error in denying· leave to the plaintiff to file her replication 
to the defendant's special plea of release. After ruling 
against the plaintiff's obvious right under common law pro· 
cedure to withdraw her motion as to a pleading alre:idy filed, 
· the Court denied to the plaintiff her statutory right to file 
a pleading of her own, namely, the replication to the defend-
ant's plea of release. By the express terms of Section 6107 
of the Code of Virginia, "any party in any '.action, at Ofl1J/ 
stage of the·proceedings, may plead as many several matters. 
whether of law or of fact, as he shall think necessary". 
7• This Code provision *can only mean that the plaintiff 
here, as a matte1· of right, should have b~en allowed to. 
file her replication, subject of course to any subsequent ac-
tion by the Court thereon. · 
See Burks' Pleading· and Pra~tice, 3rd Ed., par. 189, where 
it is said: 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
"Prior to the amendment of this statute (Sec. 6107) in 
1934, only the defendant was given the right to plead several 
matters of law or fact, and this only at the· first stage of the 
.pleading. The right is now extended to both parties and at 
any stage of the pleading·s. * ~ * It is pointed out by Profes~ 
i;:;or Graves in his Notes on Pl~ading that the English and the 
former Virginia Statutes differ in three particulars= (1) No 
leave of cou,rt is required in Virginia. * ,.., * (Italics inserted.) 
It is submitted that the Trial Court, in denying· the plaintiff 
this right given her by statute, committed reversib~e error. 
B. Wholly apart from any question of procedure, jt is 2ub-
. niitted that the Trial Court committed a substanthre error 
when it failed to hold that the plaintiff's replication was a 
complete answer to the special plea of release. On this poiut 
the principle of law involved is one of first impr~ssion in 
Virg'inia and therefore requires a careful study of similar 
cases from other jurisdictions. Before citing -those authori-
ties, however, a brief resume of the facts in the instant case 
should be helpful. 
The plaintiff originally' had one of her teeth extracted by 
the Standard United Dental Corporation in March of 1946, 
during which operation the tooth was broken off from its 
roots. Instead of proceeding with the removal of this root, 
the Dental Corporation refused to do anything further about 
the matter, presumably on the theory that the root would 
either work its way out of the gum or would be absorbed. 
On June 17, 1946, the plaintiff consulted the defendant, Dr. 
Clarke, for the purpose of having him advise her as to the 
extraction of the remaining teeth in her mouth, as to a drain-
age from around the _broken-off root, and as to ally other 
dental work that might be necessary. As the result of 
8* an X-ray examinati~n, he recommended *extraction of 
these remaining teeth, and further recommended the re-
moval at the same time of the broken-off root. After extract-
ing one of the whole teeth, and while attempting to remove 
the root, he inserted into the antrum a temporary packing 
which later was negligently sewed up in the wound. The re-
sdting infecti9n from the presence of this foreign objeet 
· caused the major portion. of the injuries for which the plain-
tiff is seeking to recover damages in the present action. 
:b,rom this statement of facts, several points became imme-
diately apparent: (1) that the plaintiff consulted the defend-
ant for general dental treatment and not exclusively, or even 
primarily, beca~se of the presence of the broken root; (2) 
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that any negligence which might haye existed on the part 
of the Dental Corporation, in breaking off this tooth three 
months before, was infinitestimal as compared to the gross 
negligence on the part of the defendant in sewing utJ a pack-
ing in the plaintiff's gum; (3) that the proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries in this case was the defendant's gro~s 
negligence in performing this act; and ( 4) that any original 
negligence on the part of the Dental Corporation could at 1no.c:t 
be only the remote cause · of such injuries. . 
When thus analyzed, the principles of law applicable to 
these facts fall into a familiar pattern. Perhaps the leading 
Virginia case on the point of causation, as it exists here, is 
Hubbard v. Mu_rmy, 173 Va. 448, 455, 3 S. E., 2nd, 397, where 
Mr. Justice Eggleston, speaking for the Court, says: . 
"From what was said in these cases we deduce the follo"\\-
ing general rule: Where a second tort f easor becomes a war~, 
or by the exercise of ordinary care should be aware, of t]w 
existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of 
an original tort feasor, and thereafter by an iµ.dependent act 
of neg·ligence brings about an accident, the condition created 
by the first tort feasor is legally insulated by the intervening 
independent negligence of the second tort fea,sor, and tl1e 
latter becomes the sole proximate cause *of the acci-
9• dent. 
'' * * • As was said in Wyatt v. Chesapeake rt Potomac 
Tel. Co., sitpra (158 Va., at pages 479,480, 163 S. E. 370, 373): 
• • * negligence carries with it liability for consequen<!eR 
which, in the light of attendant circumstances, could reason-
ably have been anticipated by a prudent man, but not f,)r 
casualties which, though possible, were wholly improbable. 
One is not charged with foreseeing that which could not 1l(l 
expected to happen.'' 
In the case at bar the defendant was fully aware of tliP 
condition in the plaintiff's mouth resulting from the presen'!e 
of the broken-off root. Whether or not there had been neg-
ligence on the part of the Dental Corporation in breaki.u~ 
that tooth, or in failing to extract it afterwards, the def enu-
ant accepted the plaintiff as a patient with complete knowl-
edge of all the medical factors involved. He could have re-
fused to treat the plaintiff if for any reason he was doubtful 
as to the need for such treatment or as to the method to be 
followed. But when he did accept the plaintiff as a patient, 
he owed to her the duty to use due care in every step of hi:, 
professional undertaking. From that moment o!1 he became 
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the principal actor-and, liable for all the consequences of 
his ueg·ligent acts. Any prior neg·ligence on the part of the 
Dental Corporation thereupon became merely a ''circum-
stance of the accident", as is clea.rly pointed ont in the ca-se 
of Powers v. Sfo,1·nberg, 213 N. C. 41, 195 -S. E. 88 ! 
"Where a second actor has become aware of the existenc~ 
of a potential danger created by the negligence of an .originnl 
tort feasor, and thereafter, by an independent act of negli-
gence, brings about an accident, the first tort f easor is re-
lieved of liability, because the condition created by him was 
merely a circumstance of the accident and not its proximate 
cause." 
The following cases all apply this principle to facts quite 
similar to those in the instant case : 
Piedmont H ospita.l v. Tru,itt, 172 S. E. 237~ 238, 48 
10* Ga. App. 15. The *plaintiff, who was injured in an au-
tomobile accident, sued the defendant hospital for dam-
ages resulting from the alleg·ed neglig·ence of one of its nursf.:~ 
in applying a heat treatment for those injuries. The defend-
ant contended that a release given by the plaintiff to· the 
driver of the automobile served to bar any action for the al-
leg·ed negligence in the treatment of the piaintiff. The Court 
says: 
'' The proper decision of this case hinges on the \1uestion, 
What was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained hy 
the plaintiff by reason of certain burns inflicted upon her, that 
is, whether it was the negligence of the original wrongdoer. 
or the intervening negligence of the defendant hospital that 
caused her injuries? * * * 
'' A prior cause cannot. be made the basis of an action bc-
ca use it furnished the condition and gave rise to the occasion 
by which the injury was made possible, where there inter-
vened an unrelated and efficient cause of the injury, even 
though such injury would not have happened bd for such 
condition or occasion. If the occurrence of the intervening 
cau~e might reasonably have been anticipated, it will not ju-
terrupt the connection .between the original cause and the in-
jury. * • • 
"But where the intervening cause was of snch a natme 
that it could not have been reasonably foreseen to be the re-
sult of the prior negligen~e, it becomes the proximate cause, 
even though the injury would not have occurred except for 
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such original negligence. * * * So, where one is negligently 
injured in an automobile wreck by the negligence, of another, 
it cannot be said as a matter of law that such negligence is 
the proximate cause of injuries received by her from bums 
caused by the negligent manner in which a nurse of the de-
fendant hospital, in which the injured person was confined 
for treatment of the injuries received in the automobile wreck. 
applied an electric treatment to the injured persori 's spirrn. 
even though treatment of her for the injuries received in 
· the automobile wreck included a treatment of her· spine with 
an electric pad. .Allison v. Jlredericksburg, 112 Va. 243, 7J 
S. E. 525, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 93. * * * 
'' It can hardly be said that the person injuring plain ti ff 
with the automobile, and the defendant hospital that injured 
plaintiff with the electric pad by burning her, were joint 
tort f easors in the commission of the same tort upon plain-
tiff . 
. "Applying the above principles, the court did not err in 
overruling the defendant's motion for new trial. * * * 
'' Judgment affirmed.'' 
11 * *The case of Parkell v. Fitzporter .. 301 :Mo. 217. 256 
S. W. 239, 243, was an action for malpractice in the dress-
ing and treatment of injuries received by the plaintiff from be-
ing run over by an automobile driven and owned by Dr. Fitz-
porter. After the accident, Dr. Fitzporter treated the plair.-
tiff for injuries sustained in the collision. Subsequently tht 
plaintiff sued him for damages caused by his negligence i11 
operating the automobile. Judgment was obtained againsL 
him, and the same was satisfied in full. The present action 
was thereafter brought against Dr. Fitzporter and another 
physician for their. malpractice in treating the injuries su:-:-
tained by the plaintiff in the accident. Recovery was al-
lowed. The following excerpts are taken from the opinion 
of the Court : 
'' The case turns upon the question whether damages caused 
by the malpractice now charged were included jn the recov-
ery had in the former suit." 
After reviewing the allegations contained in the two suits 
brought against the defendant, the Court says: 
. "Condensing these statements, we observe that, wllile fhc 
orig;inal petition charges as the injury inflicted by the nu-
tomobile that the bones of plaintiff's leg were broken and 
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shattered, and protruded 
I 
through the flesh and skin, and a 
metal clasp from his g·art¢r, dirt and cinders from the street, 
and cloth from his clothing were driven into the wounds, thh~ 
petition charges that the defendant doctors negligently and 
unskillfully sewed these things into the wound. causing in-
fection and gangrene and permanent injuries. These circum-
stances, so far from being· necessary results of the injuries, 
stated in the original petition, were entirely independent of 
those. injuries, and were not even admissible in evidence in 
that case. 
'' Applying these principles to the suit before us, we find 
no difficulty in' arriving at the conclusion that the chauffeur 
who carelessly runs his automobile upon another, inflicting 
a wound into which a metal garter buckle is driven, is guilty 
of a wrong independent of the wrong done by himself in the 
capacity of a surg·eon in connection with another surgeon in 
carelessly, unskillfully, and ignorantly sewing the garter 
buckle into the wound, and thereby inducing infection and 
gangrene, which in turns works permanent disability to 
. 12* the injured *party. These two cases, that is to say, the 
suit for nwlvracti.ce in. sewing the ga.rter buckle into 
the woitnd and the s11.1,it for negligently producing f he satne 
wownd, are fou,ndecl on two sepa,rate and distinct canses of 
actioi;·. having no necessary legal ,connection whatP1.1er~ mid 
the judgment and satisfadion, in the suit against the chGJ1.'1/-
f eur does not ba,r the si1;it for malpractice against these two 
swrgeons.'' (talics inserted.) · 
In the case of T,V elch v. Page, 85 Ind. App. 301, 154 N. E. 
24, the court was required to pass on the correctness of an 
jnstruction dealin.g with a similar situation. Action in that 
cnse was brought 1,}y the injured patient against a dentist who 
had negligently treated him. After this treatment, tbP. plain-
tiff was attended by other dentists and surgeons. 'rl1e fol-
I0,;vin2: instruction was tendered by the plaintiff but refu~ed. 
by the trial court : 
'' The Court instructs the jury that where a dentist· or 
dental surgeon is dismissed from the treatment of a tase and 
is succeeded by another physician or dentist, wl1ose employ-
ment constitutes a new ~nd independent contract, the first 
dentist or dental surgeon is not liable for the neg-ligence or 
want of skill of the succeeding physician or dentist and is 
not liable for the treatment rendered or damag·e or inj1:ry 
produced by said succeeding physician or surgeon, and I 
charge you that tho first dentist or dental surgeon is not 
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bound to show that such treatment did, in fact, result in dam-
age, injury, or harm to plaintiff. 
''This is a correct statement of the law; and the evidence 
shows that appellee dismissed appellant, employed a phyfii-
cian, and later another dental surgeon. The instruction should 
have been given." 
The facts in the case of Montgomery v. Edelstein, 280 N. 
Y. S.103, 245 App. Div. 732, are almost identical with those 
of the case at bar. The following is the complete memorm1-
dum opinion of the court : 
"Judgment in favor of plaintiff reversed on the law ancl 
the facts, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant 10 
abide the event. The evidence was sufficient to justify tht~ 
verdict that appellant was negligent in failing to remove part 
of the root of a tooth extracted· by him. The Court erred, 
however, in charging that appellant was liable for the nep:li-
g-ence of another d.entist, who fractured plaintiff's jaw 
13• when attempting *to remove the root. Carpenter v. 
Blake. 75 N. Y. 12; Doyle v. New York Eye & Ear In-
firmary, 80 N. Y. 631; Dit Bois v. Decker, 130 N. Y. 325, 29 N .. 
E. 313, 14 L. R. A. 429, 27 Am. St. Rep. 529.'' 
Up to this point, the liability of the defendant has been 
considered only as to his initial act of negligence in sewing 
up a packing in the plaintiff's gnm. Even if that were his· 
only fault, the authorities cited clearly show that be wo1,ld 
be chargeable with all of the later consequences of such a-ross 
carelessness. However, there were later acts of negligence 
on his part which grew out of his subsequent treatment of the 
plaintiff. 
It will be recalled that a serious infection of the plaintiff'~ 
gum set in following the negligent operation of June 20~ 191-fi. 
As described in the Amended Notice· of l\rfotion, "th~ wom!<1, 
as a result of the presence of the packing• • • sewed up in it 
• * * failed to heal, showed immediate signs of infection, and 
developed a discharge of pus which continued for several 
weeks". During the period from June 20 to Augm;t 12, the 
defendant continued to treat the plaintiff for the serious con-
ditions following· the spread of this infection. The defendant. 
himself irrigated the wound on several occasions, and lafor 
advised the plaintiff to have further irrigation performed by 
other physicians. On August 12 the defendant operated on 
the plaintiff in a local hospital for the removal of flJ.l of her 
remaining teeth. Before this operation was performed, the 
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plaintiff '' specifically requested ( the defendant) to explore 
the area covered by the earlier .operation on June 20, 1946, but 
(the defendant) negligently failed to do so, or negligrntly 
conducted such exploration, and therefore failed to discove:r 
the presence of the packing that had remained sew~d .up in 
the wound''. 
From these facts it is seen that the defendant, wholly apart 
from his neg·ligence in sewing up the packing in the plain ti ff' s 
gum, was further negligent in allowing this packing to 
14* remain in the gum for almost two months, and in 'X<fail-
ing· to discover it during his treatments of the plaintiff 
from June 20 to August 17-even though on one occasion he 
was specifically asked by the plaintiff to probe into the old 
wound for a possible cause of her continued infection. These 
later acts of neglig·ence on the part of the defendant consti-
tuted a new cause of action in themselves. See Barham v. 
Widing, 291 Pac. 173, 176, 210 Cal. 206: 
I '' If in spite of reasonable care on the part of the dentist to prevent infection, it nevertheless develops, or infertion ap-pears fro a c · e r ion of extracting the toot , t e dentist will not become ia e ·or neg .1~· , m performing the opera'tion, except that the subsequ,ent treat-
ient · · · rent a·use of acti,m .. 
here is a clear distinction between a ia 1 1 y w · . 
from the careless performance of an operntion or an· omis-
sion to use reasonable care in the exercise ·Of professional 
acts ·connected with the extracting· of a tooth whfoh causes 
infection, and the improper treatment of an infection which 
subsequently develops without being attributable to the neg-
ligent operation of the dentist in extracting the tooih. '' (Ital-
ics inserted.) 
Being a different cause of action from the one based upon 
the defendant's negligence in leaving the packing in the plain-
tiff's gum, then surely even counsel for the defendant mni::;t 
concede that these later acts cannot be a part of the original 
cause of action which the plaintiff may have had against the 
Dental Corporation. When analyzed, the defendant's c0n-
tention that the plaintiff's release of the Dental CorylOration 
acts as a bar to the present action against him is seen to be 
wholly specious, and without foundation either in logic or in 
fact. 
Assign,ment of Erro'l· Number Two: The Court crrAd ,in 
striking out the plaintiff's plea of estoppel to the special plea 
of release. 
Hortense B. Corbett v. Dr. J. Campbell Clarke 13 
The essential facts, upon which the plaintiff's plea of 
estoppel is based, are as· follows: The plaintiff had nlaced 
herself in the hands of the defendant for such prof es-
15<• sional treatment as the condition of her mouth might 
*require. A part of such treatment consistecl in the 
removal of the broken-off root that had been left in the plain-
tiff's gum by the Dental Corporation and Dr. Temple sev-. 
eral months earlier. This operation took place on Jnne 20, 
1946. On .A.ugust 6, 1.946, the plaintiff instituted J1er snit 
against the Dental Corporation and Dr. Temple, being at tlrnt 
time unaware of any negligence on the part of the defendant, 
for the packing·. which he had sewed up in the gum was not 
discovered until August 17. On August 15 the defendant ap-
parently learned for the first time of the plaintiff's suit against 
the Dental Corporation and Dr. Temple. He then inquired of 
the plaintiff as to whether this was true, and, when she re-
plied in the affirmative, told her that she could never prov<!. 
any negligence on the part of those defendants and spccifico-lly 
advised her to abandon, her suit ag(l;inst them. On November 
:l6, 1946, the plaintiff did in fact execute a release and dis-
missed that suit, being induced to do so by the conduct of 
the defendant. 
The plea of estoppel contain~ the following allegations: 
"That the defendant was- the one upon whom the plaintiff 
relied for professional advice and treatment and whose ex-
pert testimony would be essential in order to prove lier case 
against the Standard United Dental Corporation and Dr. L. 
R. Temple; that in making the statements aforesaid the de-
fendant was representing to her material facts which be· alone 
was in a position to lmow to be true, and which she had 110 
means of knowing to be true or false; that the said statC'-
ments were made by the defendant with the intention tJ!at 
the plaintiff should act and rely upon them; that the sitid 
statements induced the plaintiff to settle for a n~gligibh~ 
amount the then pending suit against the Standarrl United 
Dental Corporation and Dr. L. R. Temple; that in relying 
upon the advice of the defendant, the plaintiff was induced 
to do something that otherwise she would not have clone and 
which if allowed to be used by the defendant as a bar to her 
present action against him would result in great injury and 
loss to the plaintiff; that because of the defendant'R conduct 
and statements, it is inequitable for him now to claim a right 
or benefit from a condition brought about by the plaintiff's 
reliance upon said conduct and statements; and that the de-
14 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
fendant is estopped to ask considerations from the Court 
16* or to take •:.<any legal advantage by reason of the mat-
ters set forth in his said plea o.f release.'' 
It is submitted that on these facts the defendant is barred, 
under the principles of equitable estoppel, from asserting- the 
. defense set up in his plea .of release. In support of thiR con-
tention, counsel for the plaintiff point out that the very foun-
dation of equitable estoppel is "justice and good conscience". 
As is so clearly stated by Pomeroy, Equity Jurisvrudence, 
5th Edition, Vol. 3, par. 802: · 
"Its object is to prevent the unconscientious and inequi-
table assertion or enforcement of claims or rights whi<ih might 
have existed or been enforceable by other rules of the law, 
unless prevented by the estoppel; and its practical effect is, 
from motives of equity and fair dealing, to create and vest op-
- posing rights in the party who obtains the benefit of the 
estoppel. '' 
In Par. 804, the author defines the doctrine as follows: 
"Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct 
of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and 
in equity, from asserting. rig·hts which might perhaps have 
otherwise existed, either of property or contract, or· of remedy, 
as against another person who has in good faith relied upon 
such conduct, and has been led thereby to change bis posi-
tion for the worse, and ,vho on his part acquires some cor- · 
responding right, either :of property, of contract, or of 
remedy.'' · 
The same general staternent, but couched in slightly dif-
ferent words, has been made in innumerable cases hy the 
Virginia courts. 
'' The general rule of equitable estoppel, or, as is frequently 
called, 'estoppel ·iln pa.is', is that when one person, by bis 
statements, co1iduct, action, behavior, concealment, or even 
silence, has induced another, who has a right to rely uron 
those statements etc. and who does rely upon them in good 
faith to believe in the existence of the state of facts with 
which they are compatible, and act upon that belief, tho former 
will not be allowed to assert, as ag·ainst the latter. the ex~ 
istence of a different state of facts from that indicated by 
his statements or conduct, if the later has so far changed 
his position that he would be injured thereby.'' 
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17* "'Thomasson v. lVolker, 168 Va. 247, 190 S. E. 309. 
111 oyers Coal Corp. v. Whited, 157 Va. 302, 160 S. E. 
43. . 
C . .& 0. R. Co. v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 91, 40 S. E. 633. 
, Returning again to the facts of the instant case, the plain-
tiff knew, when she went to the defendant for treatment on 
Ju~e 17, 1946,, that the Dentai Corporation and Dr. Temple 
had broken off one of her teeth while attempting to extract it 
· some three months before. She decided on August 6, 1946, to 
file a suit against them, charging negligence in the abortive 
extraction -and believing that the infection she was then suf-
fering from had been c·aused by that neg·ligence. In order 
to establish such a claim she would of course have to rely 
upon the expert testimony of tl1e present defendant, Dr. 
Clarke, though he had not yet been advised of the need for 
him as a witness. ·when he learned of the pending suit on 
August 15, he told the plaintiff that she could never prove 
any neg·ligence on the part of other dentists. 
Now, what was the situation of the plaintiff at that mo-
ment f She had brought imit agaim;t the other dentists but, 
in order to prove her case against them, would of necessity 
have to show by Dr. Clarke that they bad been negligent in 
their treatment of ber. Yet here was the potential star wit-
ness stating categorically tllat the plaintiff could not prove 
her case. V{hether tl1is statement was true or false is imma-
terial, for Dr. Clarke was in a position where be either knew 
or should have known all the facts upon which his statement 
was based. Furthermore, the plaintiff had no possible way 
of determining the truth or falsity of the statement. If it. had 
been made on June 17, when she first went to Dr. Clarke and 
before he had performed any work on her mouth. she could 
could have obtained an expression of expert opinion from 
other dentists. But now, after two months had. gone by-dur-
ing· which time Dr. Clarke bad extracted the broken root, an-
other tooth, and later, all of the remaining teeth in the plain-
tiff's mouth,----.it would have been impossible for any other 
denti.st to give an intelligent opinion as to.whether or not 
18* the original dentists had been •guilty of any negligence. 
Independe11t and intervening acts of Dr. Clarke had 
created. an entirely different patllol9gical condition from the 
one which existed when he first accepted the plaintiff as a 
patient. 
Regarding the physician-patient relationship between Dr. 
Clarke and the plaintiff, tbe foHowing quotations from Pome-
roy, Equity Jurisprudence, supra, set forth an added reason 
why the doctrine of equitable estopped applies in this case: 
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Par. 655. Transactions Presumptively Invalid Between 
Persons in Fiduciary Relations. 
Par. 956. The General Principle * * * ''We are now to view 
fiduciary relations under an entirely different aspect; there 
is no intentional concealment, no misrepresentation, no actual 
fraud. The doctrine to be examined arises from the very 
conception and existence of a fiduciary relation. ·while eq~ity 
does not deny the possibility of valid transactions between 
the two parties, yet because every fiduciary relation implies 
a condition of superiority held by one of the parties over the 
other, in every transaction between them by which the su-
perior party obtains a possible benefit, equity raises a pre-
sumption against its validity,, and casts upon that party the 
burden of proving a,nrmatively its compliance with equitable 
requisites, and of thereby overcoming the presumption.'' 
Citing H eeks her v. Blanton~ . . . . Va. . ... , 66 S. E. 859, 
(111 Va. 648, 69 S. E.1045). 
Branch v. Buckley, 109 Va. 784, 65 S. E. 652. 
Par. 956 a. Cases to Which Plaintiff Extends ~ * ,1o "Courts 
of equity have carefully refrained from defining the particu-
lar instances of fiduciary relations in such a manner that . 
other and perhaps new c~ses might be excluded. It is Sl~ttlecl 
by an overwhelming weight of authority that the principle 
extends to every possible case in which a fiduciary relation 
exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one 
side, and the resulting superiority and influence on the other. 
The relation and the duties involved in it neec1 not be legal, 
it may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal. 
Ci ting Branch v. Buckley, supra. 
Par. 963. Other Relations. '' The equitab]e doctrine. ap-
plies with strictness to executors and administrators, who, 
in common with all trustees, are prohibited *from pur-
1 ~* chasing the property cf the estate when sold in course 
of administration, and from making· any personal profits 
by their dealings with it. The same general principle extends, 
with more or less force, to dealings between a physician and 
patient * * *." (Italics inserted.) 
From all that has been said above, it will be seen that in 
equity and good conscience the defendant should eertainly be 
barred from asserting the plaintiff's release of the original 
tort:.f easors as a defense to her present action against him. 
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If he was correct in his statement that a cause of action 
against them could not be proven, then a fortiori a release 
of that supposed cause of action would have no effect on a 
later action against him, based upon l1is own independent neg-
ligence. Surely that neg·ligence could be proven-merely by 
showing that he sewed up a packing in the plaintiff's gum, 
during an operation which he admittedly performed-and on 
the state of the pleadings as they exist here, this negligence 
must be taken ·as established. When viewed in this light, the 
specious nature of the defendant's so-called "plea of Re, 
lease'' stands out in bold relief. 
Assignrnen,t of Error N11mber Tkree: The Court erred in 
denying the· pla,intilf's motion.for leave to file an ainended no-
tice of 1notion in the place and stead of the ori,qinal not-ice of 
motion. 
In view of the plain language of Section 61.04 of the Code, 
counsel for the nlaintiff are at a loss to understand the action 
of the trial court in refusing to allow the amended notice of 
motion to be filed. That Sertion provides: 
''In any suit., action, motion or other proceeding hereafter 
instituted, the court may at any time in furtherance of justice, 
and upon such terms as it may deem just, permit any p]ead-
ing to be amended, or material supplemental matter be set· 
forth in amended. or supplemPntal pleadings. The court shall, 
at every stage of the proeeeding~ disregard any error or de-
fect which does not affect the substantial rights of the par-
ties.'' 
20* *It is well settled tbat this Section is remedial and 
must be liberally construed. 
8ta11,dard Pa.int Go. v. Victor and Go., 120 Va. 595, 91. S. E. 
752. 
Bailey v. Hines, 131 Va. 42t 109 S. E. 470. 
Furthermore, as was said hy the court in W a.tson v. Brwn-
ner, 128 Va. 600., 105 S. E. 97, 99: 
""" * * (the) generaltendency is in the direction of increas-
ing liberality in respect of allowing amendments., thereby en~ 
larging .the flexibility of judicial procedure to the end tba t sub-
stantial justice unembarrassed by technical niceties and 
meticulous refinements, may he readHy afforded. ~his ten-
dency is indicated by Section 6104 of the Code * • •. '' 
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In applying these principles to a particular set of facts, 
the Court had this to say in Russell Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 
137 Va. 386, 392, 119 S. E. 117 : 
'' This amendment was germane, related to the same con-
tract and the right to recoyer depended upon the same alleged 
breach thereof by the def cndants. The ehange only amplified 
the specific items or causes o.f the damages and the amount 
claimed for such alleg·ed breach.'' (Italics inserted.) 
In the case at bar it will be remembered that the only plead-
ings before the Court, at the time it denied filing of the 
amended notice of motion, were the original notice of motion, 
the defendant's special plea of release, and the plaintiff's plea 
of estoppel. (The plaintiff's replication, although tendered, 
had not been allowed to be file<l. Her plea of estoppel was, on 
motion of the defendant~ subsequently struck out.) There-
fore, by refusing to allow the plaintiff to file her amended 
notice o.f motion, the court prevented her from setting forth 
details as to the negligence of the defendvnt which plainly 
showed that the special plea of release should be .rejected. 
A careful study of the original and amended notices of motion 
will show that these additional details as to the defendant's 
neg·ligence merely furnished background particulars on his 
malpractice, which after nll was the gravamen of the plain-
tiff's action. 
·21 * * An additional reason allowing the amended notice of 
motion to be filed was the fact that it corrected a typo-
graphical error appearing in t.he original notice of motion, 
where at one place the amount said to be asked for in the 
action is erroneously given aR $10,000.00 hrntead of $25,000.00, 
as correctly shown in the last paragraph of the ·notice .. 
It is further submitted that no prejudice to the defendant, 
or delay in the course of tho proceedings, would have resulted 
from the filing of this amended notice of motion. 
A 9signment of Error Ni1,1nber Four: The Court erred in 
.~ustaining the def endont '8 special vlea of release and in enter-
ing up judgnwnt for the defen,damt. 
From what has been Raid nnder the firi:;t three aRsignments 
of error, it is submitted that the court erred in its rulings both 
as to procedural matters and as to tl1e suhstantive rights of 
the plaintiff. Apparently the court based its jndg·ment for 
the defendant on the theory that the plaintiff had onlv one 
cause of action--wbich wm, the one ag:ainst the Dentai Cor-
poration and Dr. Temple-- -and that the suhRequent negligence 
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of the present defendant, Dr. Clarke, was but an aggravation 
of that original injury. In other words, that the plaintiff 
could have recovered in her suit against them for all the in-
juries resulting from the later independent neglig·ence of Dr. 
Clarke. 
For the sake of both brevity and clarity, the plaintiff's an-
swer to this theory is set forth in t]1e following out1ine form: 
. I. The plaintiff could not liave recovered in her suit against 
the orig'inal tort-fcnsors (the Dental Corporation and Dr. 
Temple) for the subsequent malpractice of Dr. Clarke. 
A. Examination of her notiee of motion against them sl10ws 
that she made no claim for injuries resulting from Dr. Clarke's 
negligence. · · 
22* *1. The notice of motion was filed on August 6, whei·e-
as the negligence of Dr. Clarke was not discovered until 
August 17-so obviously it did not cover his malpractice. 
2. The notice of motion alleg(\s two g-rounds of negligence 
only: (a) breaking· off the tooth, and (b) failing to remove 
the root thereafter-both of whieh had come to rest when the 
plaintiff consulted Dr. Clal'ke three months later. 
B. Regardless of whether or not the notice of motion again~} 
the Dental Corporation and Dr. Temple made such a claim, 
the plaintiff could not have recovered for any injuries sus-
tained after June 20, 1946 (tl1e date of l1er first treatment by 
Dr. Clarke). 
1. The negligence of Dr. Clarke in leaving the pncking in 
the wound was a major intervening cause which broke any 
possible chain of causation betwl~en the original tort of the 
Dental Corporation and Dr. Temple, and injuries suffered 
after June 20. 
· a. The negligence of Dr. Clarke thereafter became the di~ 
rect cause, and tl1e original negligence of the DentalCorportk 
tion became the remote cause, of those injuries. 
b. The original tort-! easors could not have foreseen such 
consequences of their· negligence. · 
2. The operation performed Jjy. Dr.· Clarke was not con-
:fin~d to the removal of the broken root. This part of the 
operation was only incidental to the greater, and entirely un-
related, procedure of extrading other teeth of the plaintiff. 
23"" 
·a. Tlie ·first step in this operation was in fact the *ex-
traction of another toot!J which was in no wav neces..a · 
sitated-by the presence of the root. " 1 
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3. Dr. Clarke's later b;-eatments of the plaintiff, during 
which he. failed to discover the presence of the packing that 
he himself had placed in the w.ound, were separate acts of 
negligence in no way··connected with the incidental extraction 
of the broken root. 
4. When Dr. Clarke extracted the remaining teeth of the 
plaintiff on August 12, and at that time failed to explore the 
region where the undiscovered packing was causing- infection 
even though requested so to do by the plaintiff, he was guilty 
of a separate act of negligence apart from any earlier negli-
gence on his part. 
24• *CONCLUSION. 
Because of the etrors assigned and other errors apparent 
upon the face of the record, your petitioner prays that a writ 
of error may be grantec1, the judgment and proceedings afore-
said reviewed and reversed, the errors assig·ned corrected, 
and the judgment set aside, and that such other relief may 
· be granted your petitioner as may be proper. 
This petition is adopted as the opening brief of the plain-
tiff in error, and this petition with a transcript. of tbe rec·ord 
will be presented to the Honorable Justice John W. Eggleston, 
· at his offices in the City of Norfolk, Virginia; and petitioner's 
oounsel desire to make oral argument in favor of granting 
this writ. 
HORTENSE B. CORBETT. 
By EDWARD S. FEREBEE, and 
"WILLIAM H. SANDS, 
Counsel, whose address is 311 Na-
tional Bank of Commerce Build-
ing, Norfolk,, Virginia. 
The undersigne·d, an attorney duly qualified to practice in 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, certify that in my 
opinion the judgment complained of in the foregoing petition 
ought to be reviewed. 
Received May 16, 1947. 
·EDWARD S. FEREBEE. 
311. National Bank of Commerce 
Building, Norfolk, Virginia. 
,J. W. E. 
June 4, 1947. Writ of error awarded by the Court. Bond 
· $300. 
M. B. W.-
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RECORD • 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Court of Law and Chancery of the City 
of Norfolk, at the Court House of said City, on Tuesday 
the 4th day of :March, in the year 194 7. 
Be It Remembered, Tliat heretofore, to-wit: On the 28th 
day of October, 1946, came Hortense B. Corbett, Plaintiff, by 
her attorney, and filed ill the Clerk's Office of the Court of 
Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, her No-
tice of Motion for Judgment against J. Campbell Clarke, De-
fendant, in the words and figures following: 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To: Dr. J. Campbell Clarke 
Medical .Arts Building 
Norfolk, Virginia 
TAKE NOTICE, ·mat on Tuesday, November 12, 1946, at 
10 :00 A. M .. , or as soon thereafter as she may be heard, the 
undersigned plaintiff will move the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, at the Courthouse there-
of, for judgn1ent ag·ainst you in the amount of Ten Thousand 
D'ollars ($10,000.00), for the reason that, to-wit: 
On or about the 17th day of June 1~46, while you were 
practicing dentistrfTn the City of N oriol , Virginia, you were 
employed and retained by the plaintiff to · examine 
page 2 ~ her teeth, mouth and gms, and to adminirite, §iisb 
treajiiient ~o as a entist of reasonab e nowl-
edge, prudence and skill, and in the exercise of reasonable 
care., might deem advisable. 
The undersigned plaintiff narticularly c1-1me to you for 
dental and surgical treatment made necessary by a continued 
drainage from the cavity of one of her teeth; .ihe roots of this 
tooth had been broken · · e ac · on, and the con-
ion resu m~ rom e same was o serious proportions 
when the plaintiff consulted you for further dental treatment. 
In connection with such treatment, which continued over a 
period of several weeks, yew 1\!PJQYed tbe broken:0:ff ,roots of 
thi§4qoth, e~ te ertain e · th, p~rfofmed den'tal and 
sur~cal worr O r urns, an reated . er· or the existing 
.condition of her mou . n the course of this treatment you 
./ 
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i~d into the antru a ackin of absor t terial be-
~dto have been or the purpose o s§llJ~~~~~~:&Y 
blood from the ~nd, and then sewed up the opening into the 
gum. . 
For several weeks the plaintiff continued to receive treat-
ment from you for her condition, which, instead of clearing 
up, continu~d to grow worse. On Au 0 ·ust 14rr 19~§. it was dis-
covered that the temporary packing you .had mserted into 
the antrum had been neO'ligentlv allowed to remain . · 
a . o :µi.on s. sac 1rec an proxrma e resu t of your 
~ negttg'ence m failing to remove this packing, in failing to discover upon later examinations and treatments of the plain-tiff that this fo:reiO'n bod h . -r d to r -
page 3 ~ main in the woun , m improper y diagnosmg 1e 
cause of the continued infection of the cavity.1 and 
in failing to accord the plaintiff that deg"ree of medical and 
dental skill which she was entitled to expect from one of vour 
profession in the commu~ity, the plaintiff was and has been 
seriously and permanently injured and damaged, has been re-
quired to procure further·medical and dental attention for the 
injuries you inflicted upon lier, has been confined to the hos-
pital for treatment, has suffered severe mental and pb)rsical 
anguish, has incurred large expenses for medical supplies, 
attention and treatment,. has sustained and will continue to 
sustain a loss of earning!A in her profession as a nurse, and 
has sustained other injuries and damages both of a temporary 
and a permanent nature. 
·wHEREFORE the undersigned plaintiff asks for judg-
ment against you for damages in the amount of Twenty-fh~e 
Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00). 
HORTENSE B. CORBJ~TT 
Bv EDWARD S. FEREBEE 
· Counsel 
~DW ARD S. FEREJBEE, p. q. 
R.ETUR.N 
Executed in the City of Norfolk, Va. the 25th day of Oct., 
1946, by serving a copy hereof on Dr. J. Camnbell Clarke. . 
. ; ' 
page 4 ~ IN PERSON: 
LEE F. LAWLER 
Serti:t. City of Norfolk, ·va ... 
By R,. B. WOLFE., Deputy·. 
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And afterwards: In the said Court on the 18th day of No-
vember, 1~46: 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and there-
upon the defendant pleaded the general issue, to which the 
plaintiff replied generally and thereupon on motion of the 
plaintiff, the defendant is ordered to file herein his Grounds 
of Defense, and thereupon, on motion of the defendant, the 
plaintiff is ordered to file herein her Bill of Particulars. 
And afterwards: In the said Court on the 22nd day of 
January, 1947. 
The defendant, by counsel, appeared and with leave of 
Court filed its special plea of release to the plaintiff's notice 
of Motion; and the plaintiff moved to strike out the said piea, 
and the motion is set for ·argument on Jan. 26, 194 7, at 9 :15 
A.M. 
The following is tl1e Plea of Release referred to in the 
foregoing order: 
PLEA OF HELE.ASE. 
The plea of ,T. Campbell Clarke to the notice of motion filed 
. against him in ·this Court by Hortense B. Corbett. 
page 5 ~ This defendant., for plea to said notiee of motion 
says that the plaintiff instituted a suit against 
Standard United Dental Corporation and L. R. T~mple in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, which said suit 
was duly docketed jn that Court on the 14tl1 day of October, 
1946, for the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for 
damages proximatelv <.>ansed by the neglig·ent act of said de-
fendants. On the 26th day of November, 1946, the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, entered the following 
order in said suit: 
''Upon the motion of the plaintiff, by counsel, it is ordered 
that this notice of motion be dismissed agreed.'' 
On or about the 26th day of N ovemher, 1946, the said plain-
tiff and her counsel executed a releas(l, releasing the said de-
fendants (the original wrongdoers) from any and all liability 
for claims and demands set out in the not.ice of motion. Copies 
of the notice of motion., order of dismissal and release are 
hereto attached and made a part l1ereof. 
The alleg-ed negligence of Dr. Clarke is the insertion of 
absorbent material into the antrum from whi<.>h the broken l} tooth was removed by him, aggravating the existing infection. 
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The alleged negligence of· Dr~ Clarke is a proximate 1·esult of 
the negligence of the Standard United Dental Corporation 
and L. R. Temple. That the said plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover, and did recover, in the suit brought against Standard 
United Dental Corporation andL~ R. Temple all damages she 
claimed she is entitled to1 recover in the suit against the de-
. fendant J. Campboll Clarke. Tbe said release and 
page 6 ~ order entered by the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk on the 26th day of November, 1946, did re-
lease the Standard United Dental Corporation and L. R. 
Temple ( the original wrongdoers) from any and all liability 
of the several matters and things in the notice of motion men-
tioned and complained of, for which a recovery is sought 
against this defendant. 
WHEREFORE this defendant pleads the said release and 
order in bar of the claims in the notice of motion, and prays 
judgment of this Honorable Court whether he shall be com-
pelled to make any further or other answer to the said notice 
of motion, and prays tq. be hence dismissed with his reason-
able costs in this behalf· expended . 
. Attorney for Defendant. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Hortense B. Corbett, Plaintiff, 
v. . 
Standard United Dental Corporation, and Dr. L. R. Temple, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To: Standard United Dental Corporation, 
and Dr. L. R. Temple, 
105 West Main Street 
Norfolk., Virginia. 
page 7 ~ Take Notice, that on Monday, .A.ugust 26, 1946, at 
10 :00 A. M., or as soon thereafter as she may be 
heard, the undersigned plnintiff will mov~ the Circuit Court 
of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, at the Courthouse thereof. 
for judgment against· yot~, and each of you, in the amount of 
Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), for the reason that, to-
wit: 
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On or about the 1st day of March, 1946, while you, and each 
o! ~ou, were practicing· dentistry in the City of Norfolk, Vir-
grnia, and representing that you were dentists of such degree 
of knowledge and skill as would enable you to administer 
dental treatment to those requiring the same, you were and 
employed and retained by the plaintiff to examine her teeth, 
mouth and gums, and to administer surh treatment ther~to 
as dentists of reasonable knowledge, prudence and skill, and 
in the exercise of reasonable care, might deem advisable . 
. The said employment was accepted by you, and, on the 
date herein above mentioned, and certain days thereafter, you 
made examination of the teeth, mouth and gums of the plain-, 
tiff and undertook to render and administer to her such treat-
ment as the existing- conditions required and as was proper 
in the exercise of reasonaMe care, more particularly in ex-
tracting· certain teeth of the plaintiff. In extracting one of 
these teeth, 1ou neo·li 0 ·c br e t th off from its ro · t 
and, when r ques ec y the plaintiff o con rnue WI he re-
moval · · n r 
pag·e 8 ~~- . ou were 
again performing dental work on the plam 1 / you 
likewise failed and refused to take any steps to remove the 
roots of the tooth which had been broken off, notwithstanding 
the fact that the socket was infected and that further dental 
treatment was plainly indicated. In spite of your representa-
tions to administer dental treatment in a skillful, professional 
and proper manner, and in spite of your undertaking so to do, 
you failed to exercise the degree of care required of you, and 
did so neg·ligently and carelessly perform said acts, render 
and administer treatments to her, and did so negligently and 
carelessly advise and treat the plaintiff after the performance 
of such acts and ministrations, that the plaintiff., as a proxi-
mate result of your negligence and carelessness, has been 
greatly injured and damaged, has been required to procure 
further medical and dental attention for the injuries you 
inflicted upon her, has undergone serious surgfoal operations 
to her mouth and gums, has suffered severe mental and physi-
cal anguish, has incurred large expenses for medical treat-
ment., has sustained a loss of earning·s in her profession as a 
nurse, and bas sustained other serious injuries and damages 
both of a temporary and a permanent natur~. 
'Wherefore, the undersigned plaintiff asks for judgment 
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against you, and each of you, for damages in the amount of 
Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). 
page 9 ~ HORTENSE B. CORBETT 
By EDWARD ·s. FEREBEE 
Counsel. 
EDWARD S. FEREBEE, p. q. 
A Copy Teste : 
W. R. HANCKEL, Clerk 
By .................... D. C. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, on the 26th day 
of November~ in the year 1946. 
Hortense B. Corbett, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Standard United Dental Corp., et al., Defendants. 
ON MOTION. FOR JUDGMENT. 
Upon the motion of the plaintiff, by counsel) it is ordered 
that this notice of niotion be dismissed agreed. 
A Copy Teste : 
W.R. HANCKEL, Clerk 
By .......... · .......... D. C. 
In consideration of the· payment of the sum ot Two Hun- J 
dred Twenty-Five Dollars ($225.00) by the Standard Uniter). 
Dental Corporation to . the undersigned, she hereby releases 
the said Standard United Dental Corporation, its officers or 
employees, direct.ors, and Dr. L. R. Temple fron ll 
manner of act· · · 
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Witness the following signatqres this . ~. day of N ovem-
ber, 1946. · 
HORTENSE B. CORBETT 
.Attorney for Hortense B. Corbett 
And afterwards on the 4th <lay of March, 1947, came again 
the parties, by their attorneys, and the plaintiff filed in Court 
the following Plea of Estoppel to the Plea of· Release of the 
Defendant: 
PLE4 OF ESTOPPEL TO PLE.1-~ OF RELE.ASE . 
.And the said plaintiff comes and says that, without con-
fessing or denying; matters of fact contained in the plea of re-
lease., the said defendant oug·ht not to be permitted to file said 
plea of release, and the same should not be received by the 
Court, for the reason tbat the said defendant. on or about 
August 15, 1946, inquired of the said plaintiff whether she 
was bringing or had brought legal action against Standard 
United Dental Corporation and Dr. L. R. Temple for damages 
resulting· from malpractice: in their treatment of 
page 11 ~ her, and ,,yhen Rhe replied in the, affirmative, the 
defendant told her that she could never prove any 
neg·ligence on the part of said parties and speC'ifically advised 
her to abandon her suit a,winst them. 
That the defendant w~s the one upon whom the plaintiff 
relied for professional advice and treatment and whose ex-
pert testimony would be essential in order to prove her case 
against the Standard United Dental Corporation and Dr. L. R. 
Temple; that in making the statements aforesaid the defend-
ant was representing to her material facts which he alone was 
in a position to know to be true, and which she had no means 
of knowing to be true or false; that the said statements were 
made by the defendant with the intention that the plaintiff 
should act and rely upon them; that the said statements in-
duced the plaintiff to settle for a negligible amount the then 
pending suit against the Standard United Dental Corpora-
tion and Dr. L. R. Temple; that iu relying- upon the advice 
of the defendant, the plaintiff was induced to do something 
that otherwise she would not have done and which if allowed 
to be used by the defendant as a bar to her present action 
against him would result in great injury and loss to the plain-
tiff; that because of the defendant's conduct and statements, 
it is inequitable for him now to claim n right or benefit from 
a condition broug·ht about by the plaintiff's reliance upon 
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, said .conduct and staterrtents; and that the defendant is 
estopped to ask consideration from the Court or to take any 
legal advantage by reason of the matters set forth 
page 12 ~ in his said plea of release. 
WHEREFORE, the said plaintiff pleads that the said plea 
of release be rejected artd that the said defendant be com-
pelled to make such further or other answer as he may de-
sire. 
HOR.TENSE B. CORBETT 
Bv EDWARD S. FEREBEE 
·· Counsel 
And again on the 4th day of March, 1947, the plaintiff ten-
dered in Court the following Replication to the Plea of Re-
lease of the def end ant: 
REPLICATION. TO PLEA OF HELE.A.SE. 
The said plaintiff, by her attorney,, comes and ~ays that,. 
notwithstanding anything alleged by the said defendant in 
his Plea of Release, this Court ought not to bar the plain-
tiff's action, should strike out tl1e said plea, and should com-
pel the defendant to make such further answer and defense 
to the said action as he may be advised so to do. 
· In support whereof, the plaintiff avers that she first con-
sulted the defendant on ,June 17, 1946, for the purpose of hav-
ing the remainder of her teeth extracted, and .for such other 
dental and surgical work as might be required by the condi-
tion of her mouth. After the examination, the defendant con-
firmed the necessity for extracting these remaining teeth be-
cause of their g·enerally poor condition, and regard-
page 13 ~ less of what might or mig·ht not have heen ... done 
to her mouth in earlier dental treatments. He also 
advised the plaintiff that while such work was h~ing under-
taken, it would be wise to remove the roots of the broken tooth 
which was shown by X-ray to be still in her head. Accord-
ingly, an appointment was made with the defendant for June 
20, 1946, to perform· the necessary work in extracting the re-
maining teeth and in removing the roots of the broken tooth. 
The plaintiff does deny that certain allegation in the said 
Plea of Release which sets forth as follows: '' The alleged 
negligence of Dr. Clarke is the insertion of absorbent ma-
terial into the antrum from whic.li the br@~en tq~s t~-
move<]J,u hir1J.,.!!/lf},t;.<W(ltiiiii.1b.LJ~1J..{i1JJL.i.~. · .~ .. ~;" 
coiifrary, tlie plamhff avers that be1ore the said broienoo'ffF" 
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was removed by. the defendant, he did proceed to extract an-
other tooth of the plaintiff which was in no way affected by the 
1 
f, said broken tooth but which the defendant had previously ad-
vised her was in need of extraction because of its own condi-
tion; that considerable bleeding took plare from the work 
already performed in this operation; that th~ defendant then 
began work on the extraction of the broken tooth, but before 
accomplishing the same, or completing his rare for the wound 
resulting from the first extraction, twice left the plaintiff un-
attended in order to treat another of his patients in an ad-
joining office; that in the course of operating on the plaintiff, 
the defendant inserted into the open wound a packing which 
· was later negligently sewed up in that wound; and 
page 14 ~ that the aforesaid acts of neg·ligence on the part of 
the defendant, rather than aggravating an exist-
ing infection, amounted to a separate and distinct injury 
from the one caused to the plaintiff by the dentist who had 
previously broken off the other tooth, for there was in fact 
no infection existing in the plaintiff's mouth at the time th~ 
defendant performed the operations ahove described. 
. The plaintiff further denies that certain allegation in the 
said Plea of Release whic11 sets forth as follows: '"rhe al-
leged negligence of Dr. Clarke is a proximate result of the 
negligence of the Standard United Dental Corporation and 
L. R. Temple.'' On the contrary, the plaintiff avers that the 
negligence of the defenda11t, as to the matters charged in her 
notice of motion, was separate and distinct from the original 
negligence of the other said partie:-., l1ad no causal connection 
therewith, constituted an entirely independent and unrelated 
injury,, and arose out of the dental treatment being given by 
the defendant for a condition in no wav connected with the 
original injury caused by the otf1er Raid ~partieR. 
The plaintiff further denies those certain allegations in 
said Plea of Release which set forth that the plaintiff was 
entitled to recover, and did recover, against the Standard 
United Dental Corporation and L. R. Temple all dama~t?s 81Je 
claims she is entitled to recover against the defendant in the 
present suit, and further denies that the release exeented by 
her to the other said parties did in fact cover the 
page 15 ~ injury and damages caused by the defendant as 
described in the notice of motion in this rase. On 
the contrary, the plaintiff avers that when she filed her origi-
nal suit against the Standard United Dental Corporation fiml 
L. R. Temple on August 6, 1946, she had no knowledg-e of 
any negligence on the part of the defendant herein, Rnrl be-
lieved tha.t the infection then and thereafter existing in her 
mouth was caused by the negligence of the other said parties; 
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that not until August 17, 1946, when the packing hereinl.1efore 
described was found to have been sewed up in her moutl1 by 
the defendant, did she discover the true cause of this infec-
tion to be the. separate and independent negligence and mal-
practice of the defendant herein. When this discovery was 
made, the plain~i:ff understood, and was so advised by lier 
attorney, that she had no claim ag·ainst the other said pa1·ties 
for injuries and damages arising out of the independent ac-
tions and treatments of the defendant; and that she was en-
titled to collect. from the other said parties only for such in-
juries and damages which she had sustained up to th/;\ t:mc 
when the defendant, on June 20, 1946, independently arnl neg-
ligently injured and damaged her as set forth in hew notice 
of motion against him. On October 24, 1946, the plaintiff 
filed her present action against the defendant herein; a11cl on 
November 26, 1946, while the present action was still pend-· 
ing, dismissed her original action against the other sui<l pur., 
ties and executed to the:rri her release, as described in the Emid 
Plea of Release. . 
The plaintiff further avers that the above men-
page 16 ~ tioned release does not discharge, and wss not in-
tended by either party thereto to disclrnrg:e, the 
defendant from· any 01· all claims which she might have a~;ain~t 
him for his independent negligence and malpracti<te; that the 
consideration of $225.00 received by her for this release was 
based almost entirely on the actual. financial loss suffered by 
the plaintiff as the result of the original injury caused to her 
by the other said parties, continuing up to June 20,' 19:l6; and 
that the said consideration was infinitesimal compared to the 
injuries and damages suffered by her as the .result of the de-
fendant's own independent negligence and malpractice. as set 
forth in her present notice of motion. 
The plaintiff further avers that on or about August 15, 
1946, which was shortly b,efore the packing was disrovered to 
have been left in her mouth and was therefore at a time when 
she believed the existing :infection was the result of the 01·igi-
nal negligence of the oth~r said parties, the defendant ap-
parently first learned of the plaintiff's pending action fl:!ainst 
the other said parties; ~hat on her visit to the defendant's 
office for treatment on this day the defendant asked her if 
she was bringing such an action ; that when she rep 1 ied in the 
affirmative, the defendant told her that she could nevor prove 
any negligence on the part of the other said parties, and spe-
cifically. advised her to abandon her suit against them; and 
that such statements by the defendant substantially jnflu-
enced her decision to execute the above mentioned release,' for 
without the benefit of professional testimony from the de-
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fendant she would have been unable to establish 
page 17 ~ her claims of neg·ligence on the part of the ether 
said parties. 
The plaintiff further avers that the negligence of the de-
fendant consisted of the following matters, all of which were 
independent of the defendant's work in extracting tlie bl'oken 
tooth hereinabove referred to: (1) In leaving the plaintiff 
unattended while in the midst of performing a seriou::i dental 
operation, in order to treat another patient in an acl,joining 
office. This act of negligence occurring immedi~tely fo1low-
ing the extraction of the first tooth, before that operation was 
completed, and before the broken tooth had ever been re-
, moved; (2) In inserting a packing into the open ,vound re-
sulting from the operation performed on the plaintiff's 
mouth, which was sewed up and allowed to remain the1\1 for 
almost two months. This act of negligence occurred in the 
course of an operation involving first, the extraction of a 
tooth that had never been treated in any way by other den-
tists and that was being removed as a part of the genP.ral 
dental treatment recommended by the defendant, and sec-
ondly, the extraction of the broken tooth hereinbefore men-
tioned; (3) In failing to discover the presence of t.bh; pack-
ing upon later examinations and treatments of the plaintiff, 
one of which on August 12, 1946, involved the extraction of 
the ten remaining teeth in the plaintiff's mouth. Tho extrac-
tion of these teeth was recommended on June 17, 1946, by the 
defendant because of their own condition, and wholly with-
out any regard to any need for the earlier extraction of the 
broken tooth. At the time of the extraction of 
page 18 ~ these teeth, the defendant was specifically re-
quested by the plaintiff to explore the area cov-
• ered by the earlier operation on June 20, 1946, but neglected 
so to do, and therefore failed to discover the presence of the 
said packing; ( 4) In failing to diagnose properly the cause of 
the extreme infection which set in during the entire time 
this packing was allowed to remain in the wound ; and ( 5) 
In failing to accord the plantiff that degree of medical and 
dental skill which she was entitled to receive from a compe-
tent dentist in her own community. 
And all of this the said plaintiff prays may be inquired of 
by the country, and she is re~dy to verify. 
EDWARD S. FEREBEE, 
Attorney for the Plaintiff. 
And again on the 4th day of March, the defendallt filed in 
Court the following· objections to filing of the replication by 
the plaintiff: 
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OBJECTION TO FILING REPLICATION. 
The defendant Qbjects to the plaintiff's motion and leave 
to file her replication on the following grounds: 
1. That the replication violates the .rule against a litigant 
assµming· inconsistent positions in the course of a judicial 
proceeding, and assuming an. inconsistent position with a 
letter written py the plaintiff's attorney and agent 
page 19 ~ dated October 1.4, 1946, to the defendant, Dr. Clai·ke, 
which states, in part, as follows: 
"On or about June 17, 1946, Mrs. Corbett came to you for 
dental and surgical treatment made necessary by an infection 
which had set in around: the roots . of one of her teeth. The 
roots of this tooth had been broken off in a prior· extraction, 
and the infection surrounding the same had reached serious 
proportions by the time you were consulted in the matter." 
2. The replication is vague, indefinite and uncertain. 
3. It does not allege any facts which constitute a defense 
to the special plea. . 
4. It states facts which are inconsistent with other facts 
stated in the same replication. 
5. It does not state any facts showing that "the negligence 
of defendant was separate and distinct from the ociginal neg-
ligence of the other parties, and was an entirely independent 
and unrelated injury". 
6. It does not allege that any act of independent negli-
gence caused the infection, or the troubles now complained of . 
in her notice of motion. • 
7. It does not allege a:hy facts showing that Dr. Clarke in-
jured or damaged the plaintiff except in connection with his 
treatment to remedy the cc,ndition caused by the dental cor-
poration. 
page 20 ~ And again on the 4th day of March, 1947, the 
. plaintiff tendered the following Amended Notice 
of Motion for Judgm~nt: 
AMENDED NOTICE'O]' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
, 
To: Dr. J. Campbell Clarke, 
Medical Arts Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
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TAKE NOTICE that ttie undersigned plaintiff will, as 
soon as she may be heard, move the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, at the· Courthouse 
thereof, for judgment against you in the amount of Twenty-
five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00), for the reason that, to-
wit: · 
On or about the 17th day of June, 1946, while you were 
practicing dentistry in the City of Norfolk, Virg'inia, you 
were employed and retained by the plaintiff to examine her 
teeth, mouth and gums, and to administer such treatment 
thereto as a dentist of reasonable knowledge, prudence and 
skill, and in the exercise of reasonable care, might deem ad-
visable. You were specifically consulted by the plaintiff for 
the purpose of having the remainder of her teeth extracted, 
and for such other dental and surgical work as might be re-
quired by the condition of her mouth. 
After an examination .of her mouth on the aforesaid date, 
you confirmod the necessity for extracting these remaining 
teeth of the plaintiff, and also advised that while such work 
was being undertaken, it would be wise to remove the roots of 
a broken tooth whiclJ was shown· by X-ray to be still in her 
head. 
Accordingly, an appointment was made with you 
pag·e 21 ~ for June 20, 1946, to perform the above· described 
dental operations. 
On the said date, to-wit, lune ·20, 1946, you did proceed 
with the operation of extracting· one of the remaining teeth 
of the plaintiff which you previously advised her should be 
taken out because of its own condition. Considerable bleed-
ing took place from the work performed in the extraction of 
this tooth. After this operation was completed, you then be-
gan the operation of extracting the broken tooth hereinabove 
referred to, but before accomplishing the same, or complet-
ing your care of the wound resulting from the first ,extrac-
tion, you t'\\'ice left the plaintiff unattended in order to· treat 
another of your patients in an adjoining office. In the course 
of performing these joint operatio11s on the plaintiff, you in-
serted a packing· into the open wound necessitated by the 
same, which packing' was later discovered by the plaintiff to 
have been negligently sewed up by you in that wound. 
For a period of several weeks thereafter, the plaintiff con-
tinued to receive treatment from you for the ·Conditions which 
followed, and were caused by, your negligence in perform-
ing- the said operations. An immediate s,velling -occurred in 
the area of the plaintiff's face surrounding the point where 
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you had operated on lier mouth. The wound, as a result of 
the pr~sence of the packing that you had negligently sewed up 
in it as aforesaid, failed to heal, showed immediate signs of 
infection, and developed .a discharge of pus which continued 
for several weeks. 
page 22 ~ · For the period.from June 20, 1946,to Aug·ust 17, 
· 1946, you continued to treat the plaintiff for the 
. serious .-condi'tions following the spread of· the infection from 
the aforesa'id operation. In connection with such treatments, 
you irrigated' the said wound on various occasions, and ad-
vised the plaintiff to have further irrigations of the wound 
performed by other physicians and specialists,. which advice 
was followed by the plaintiff. 
During this period, to-wit, on August 12, 1946, you advised 
the plaintiff to enter a hospital, where you proceeded to per- · . 
form a further dental operation on the plaintiff consisting· of 
the extraction of the remaining teeth in the plaintiff's mouth. 
The extraction of these teeth had been recommended bv vou 
on June 11, 1946, because of their condition at that time. ·Be-
fore you proceeded with the extraction of these teeth on Au-
gust 12, 1946, the plaint~ff specifically requested you to ex-
plore the area covered by the earlier operation on June 20-, 
1946, but you negligently failed to do so, or negligently con-
ducted such exploration, and therefore failed to discover the 
presence of the packing that had remained sewed up in the 
wound. 
On August 17, 1946, the plaintiff by her own efforts dis-
covered the presence of the packing you bad negligently 
sewed up in her mouth on June 20, 1946. When she showed 
this packing to you, you first attempted to deny responsi-
bility for the same but later admitted that it had 
page 23 ~ been inserted into the plaintiff's mouth by you 
· during· the operation performed on June 20, 1946 . 
. Between June 20, 1946, and August 17, 1946, the plaintiff 
was under the impression that you had been treating her at 
all times with proper skill and care, and was wholly unaware 
of your negligence and carelessness in sewing up the pack-
ing in her mouth, in failing to · discover the same, and in 
failing properly to diagnose the cause of the infection re-
sulting therefrom. She assumed that this infection had set 
in after your operations of June 20, 1946, without any fault 
on your part, for there was no infection in h~r mouth when 
she first came to you for treatment. Not until the packing 
was discovered did she know, or have any reason to know, 
that this infection was , solely due to your neglig·ence and 
carelessness as aforesaid. The plaintiff now avers that the 
injuries arising from this negligence and malpractice on your 
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part created in her favor a cause of action against you which 
was sep~rate and distinct from any she may theretofore have 
had agmnst any other person; and that there was no causal 
connection whatsoever between the said injuries and any in-
jury she may have sustained as the result of the negligence of 
such other person. 
The plaintiff alleges that your negligence consisted of' the 
following matters: In failing· to accord the plaintiff that 
degree of medic.al and dental skill which she was entitled to 
Teceive from a ~ompetent dentist practicing in her own com-
munity; in leaving a packing in the open wound 
page 24 ~ made during the aforesaid operations· of June 20, 
. 1946; in sewing up the wound without removing· 
this packing; in allowing the packing to remain in this wound 
for almost two months; and in failing to discover the pres-
ence of this packing upon later examinations and treatments 
of the plaintiff, extending over the period from J uue 20, 1946, 
to August 17, 1946, on one of which occasions you were spe-
cifically requested by the plaintiff to explore the said wound 
for the purpose of determh1ing what might be causing the in-
fection arising therefrom. 
As a direct and proximate resu1t of your negligence as 
aforesaid, the plaintiff has suffered and will continue to 
suffer great physical pain and mental anguish from the seri-
ous infection caused by the presence of the said packing in 
her mouth for such a prolonged period of time; has sustained 
grave permanent injury to her. nervous system; has devel-
oped permanent stiffness and soreness in her joints, such as 
seriously to impair her freedom of movement; has been, and 
will in the future be, unable to perform her household duties 
and responsibilities; has been confined to the hospital; has 
incurred, and will in the future be compelled to incur, large 
expenses for medical supplies, attention and treatment; bas 
sustained a great loss of earnings and earning capacity in her 
profession as a nurse, both past and future; and has been 
seriously and permanently injured and damaged, both from 
conditions above mentioned and otherwise. 
"WHEREFORE the undersigned plaintiff asks for judg-
. ment against you for damages in the amount of 
page 25 ~ Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00). 
HORTENSE B. CORBETT, 
By EDWARD S. FER.EBEE, 
Counsel. 
EDWARD S. FEREBEE, p. q. 
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- And now: In the said: Court on the 4th day · of March, in 
the year 1947 : 
This day came . again the parties, by their attorneys, and 
the plaintiff asked leave to withdraw her motion to strike out 
the special plea of release and file her replication, thereupon 
tendered. 1 
Thereupon the defendant objected to such leave being 
granted, and objected to the filing of the replication on the 
grounds set out in writing·, filed with the papers in this cause, 
and moved the. Court to enter up .judgment for the def end-
ant on the plea of release, which said motions and objections 
being argued,' the motions of the plaintiff are denied, and the 
objections and motions of the defendant are sustained. To 
which action of the Court the plaintiff duly excepted. 
Whereupon the plaintiff asked leave to file a plea of 
estoppel to the said special plea of release, and also asked 
leave to file an amended notice of motion in the plar.e and stead 
of the original notice of motion heretofore :filed, 
page 26 ~ ich mo · n to file a lea of esto el to the said 
\J
. special plea o re ease 1s gran e . To which ac-
tion of the Court the defendant duly excepted, and the mo-
tion to file the amended notice of motion is denied. To which 
action of the Court the plaintiff duly excepted. 
Thereupon the...,defepc]ant moved to strike out the plea of 
estoppel to the plea of release, which motion is hereby sus""' 
t'ained, and it is considered by the Court that the special plea 
of release be, and the same is hereby, sustained and that the 
plaintiff take nothing by her notice of motion for judgment, 
and that the defendant go thereof without day and recover 
of the plaintiff his costs by him in this behalf expended, and. 
the suit is hereby dismissed. To which action the said plain-
tiff, by her attorney, duly excepted. 
I 
NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
Leigh D. Williams, Esq~, 
Attorney at Law, 
Counsel for J. Campbell Clarke, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
In Re: Hortense B. Corbett v. 
J. Campbell Clarke. 
March 8, 194 7. 
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Dear Sir-: 
· In accordance with the provisions of Section 6339, Code of 
Virginia, notice is hereby given that the under-
page -27} signed intends to apply for a transcript of the rec-
ord in the above case, to the Clerk of the Law and 
Chancery Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, and to pre-
sent a petition for writ of error to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia. 
Very truly yours, 
HORTENSE B. CORBETT, 
By EDWARDS. FEREBEE, 
· Counsel. 
I acknowledge receipt of above. 
LEIGH D. WILLIAMS (jk) 
LEIGH D. WILLIAMS, 
Counsel for ·J. Campbell Clarke, Defendant. 
page 28 } CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NUMBER 
ONE. 
Be it remembered that on the 4th day of March, 1947, the 
plaintiff, by her attorney, asked leave to withdraw her motion 
to strike out the special plea of release, and asked leave to 
file her replication, thereupon tendered, which said motions 
were denied, to which action of the Court the plaintiff duly 
excepted upon the f ollowjng grounds: 
· A. As to the denial of leave to withdraw the motion to 
strike out the special plea of release : 
1. That a motion to strike out any plea may be made with-
out prior leave to court. Similarly, that such a motion may 
be withdrawn as a matter of right, and without leave of court, 
at any time prior to the time it pas been ruled upon. 
2. That the plaintiff asked leave to withdraw her motion 
to strike out the special plea of release before the court either 
considered or ruled upon the same, and before any further 
pleadings had been filed. 
B. As to the denial of leave to file the replication: 
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1. That pursuant to Section 6107 of the Code of Virginia, 
"any party in any action, at any· stage of the pleadings, may 
plead as many several matters, whether or law or of fact, 
as he shall think necessary". That the plaintiff, under this 
section of the Code, should have been allowed to file her repli-
cation as a matter of right. · 
2. That the facts ·set forth in the replication plainly show 
that the cause of action being sued upo_n by the plaintiff. was 
separate, .distinct and independent from the cause of action 
set forth in the defendant's special plea of release, and that 
the said plea of release should have been rejected. 
page 29 ~ 3. That there is no inconsistency on the part of 
the plaintiff in this case, either during the course 
of a judicial proceeding or otherwise; that as to the letter of 
October 14, 1946, written to the defendant by plaintiff's coun-
sel, if there is in fact any inconsistency between the state-
ments contained therein and the notice of motion subse-
quently filed by the plaintiff, it was due solely to a misappre-
hension on the part of plaintiff's counsel as to the true facts 
in the case; and that when the no.tice of motion was subse-
quently drawn up and filed on October 24, 1946, the true facts 
<is to the plaintiff's injury were therein set forth. 
April 9th, 1947. 
RI.CHARD~. SPINDLE, JudgeM 
A Copy-Teste: 
, RICHARD B. SPINDLE, JudgeM 
page 30 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NUMBER 
TWO. 
Be it remembered that on the 4th day of March, 1947, the 
plaintiff, by her attorney, asked leave to file a plea of estoppel 
to the said :Rlea of release, which motion was granted, to 
which action of the Court the defendant duly excepted and 
thereupon the said defendant moved to strike out the plea 
of estoppel to the plea of release on the following grounds : 
· 1. There is no allegation in the plea of estoppel that the 
statements alleged to have been made by Dr. Clarke were 
untrue. 
2. That it does not show that the party estopped was misled 
by the misrepresentations. 
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3. 0~ that the alleged statement and advice were given in 
bad faith. · 
· 4. That the statements in the plea of estoppel were mere 
opinions and not a misrepresentation of a material fact. 
5. That the record shows that she did not rely on these 
"Rtatements, but on the statements of her counsel. 
6. It does not show that Mrs. ·Corbett was without knowl· 
edge or without convenient and available means for acquir-, 
ing knowledge, or that she exercised due diligence to ascer• 
tain· the true facts, 
- which motion of the defendant was sustained, to which ac· 
tion the plaintiff, by her attorney, duly excepted upon the 
following gTounds: 
1. That the facts set forth in the plea of estoppel plainly 
show that the defendant, by his conduct and words 
page 31 r to the plaintiff, induced the plaintiff to execute the 
release to the Standard United Dental Corpora .. 
tion, and is the ref ore barred from now relying upon such re .. 
lease as a defense to the present action. 
April 9th, 1947. 
RICHARD B. SPINDLE, Judg·e. 
A Copy-Teste : 
RICHARD B. SPINDLE, Judge. 
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. THREE. 
Be it remembered that on the 4th day of March, 19-47, the 
plaintiff, by her attorney, asked leave to file an amended 
notice of motion in the place and stead of the orig·inal notice 
of motion theretofore filed, which said motion was denied 
and to which action of the Court the plaintiff duly excepted 
upon the following grounds: 
1. That the amended notice of motion sets forth additional 
details as to the nature of the plaintiff's claim, all of which 
plainly show that the cause of action against the defendant 
is entirely separate and distinct from the one originally ex .. 
isting in favor of the plaintiff against the Standard United 
Dental Corporation. 
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2. That the amended1 notice of motion corrects a typo-
graphical error appearing in the original notice of motion, 
where at one place the · amount said to be asked for in the 
action is erroneously given as $10,000.00 instead of $25,000.00, 
as correctly shown in the last . paragraph of the original no-
tice of motion and throughout the amended notice of motion. 
,3. The additional details as to the plaintiff's case, as set 
forth in the amended notice of motion, constituted material 
supplemental matter, and should have been permitted to be 
filed in the furtherance of justice and the proper development 
of the plaintiff's case. · 
4. No prejudice to the defendant, or delay in the course of 
the proceeding, would result from the filing of the amended 
notice of motion. 
April 9th, 1947. 
RICHARD B. SPINDLE, Judge. 
A Copy-Teste : 
RICHARD B. SPINDLE, Judge. 
page 33 } CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NUMBER 
FOUR. 
Be it remembered that on the 4th day of March, 1947, the 
plaintiff, by her attorney, excepted to the action of the Court 
in sustaining the defendant's special plea of release and in 
entering up judgment for the defendant, upon the following 
grounds: 
1. That the Court erred in respect" to its various rulings 
referred to in Certificate of Exception Number One, Num-
ber Two and Number Three, for the reasons set forth therein. 
2. That the plaintiff, in her pleadings, stated a good cause 
of action which should entitle her to a jury trial on the merits 
of her case. 
April 9th, 1947. 
RICHARD B. SPINDLE, Judge. 
A CopY.~Teste : 
RICHARD B. SPINDLE, Judge. 
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page 34 ~ JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, Richard B. Spindle, Judge of the Corporation Court of 
the City of Norfolk, Virg'inia, sitting for and in the place 
and stead and at the request of Judge 0. L. Shackleford of 
the Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, do certify that the foregoing Certificates of Exception 
Numbers One to Four were presented to me for certification 
within sixty days after tbe final order in said Court, and that 
the attorney for the defendant had reasonable notice in writ-
ing of the time and place in which the same would be tendered 
for certification. 
Given under my band this 9th day of April, 1947. 
RICHARD B. SPINDLE, Judge. 
A Copy-Teste: 
RICHARD B. SPINDLE, Judge. 
page 35 ~ Virginia : 
[n the Clerk's Office of the Court of Law and Chancery of 
the City of Norfolk. 
I, W. L. Prieur, Jr., Clerk of the Court of Law and Chan-
cery of the City of Norfolk, do hereby certify that the fore-
g·oing is a true transcript of the record in the case of Hor-. 
tense B. Corbett, Plaintiff, v. J. Campbell Clarke, Defend-
ant, lately pending in. said Court. 
I further certify that the said copy was not made up and 
completed until the defendant had had due notice of the mak- -_ 
ing of the same, and the intention of the plaintiff to take an 
appeal therein. 
Given under my band this 14th day of :March, in the year 
1947. 
W. L. PRIEUR, ,JR., Clerk. 
By L. L. UNDERWOOD, ,TR., D. C. 
Fee for this Record: $18.50. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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